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In the Supreme C.ourl of the Stale of Utah 
.JUNE SINGLETON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
GEORGE V. ALEXANDER and 
\VILLIAM J. GREEN, a copartnership, 
d/h/a CAREFREE LAUNDRY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
Case No. 
10780 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is a personal injury action arising out of 
plaintiff-appellant's slipping and falling in water from 
an overflowing public toilet in defendant-respondents' 
self-servicP laundromat. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Trial Court granted defendant-respondents' 
mot ion for summary judgment and costs. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-respondents pray that the judgment be 
affirmed and that they be awarded their costs on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants cannot agree with plaintiff's statement 
of facts and her brief fails to properly cite the record 
herein. Therefore, defendants will restate the facts. 
Deposition citations below refer to plaintiff's own testi-
mony. 
Plaintiff, as a business invitee, entered defendants' 
self-service laundry, knowing it was a self-service 
laundry ( Depo., p. 5, 1. 8). No employee was present 
while plaintiff was in the premises but employees are 
customarily not present in self-service laundries and 
customers run the coin-operated machines themselves. 
(Depo., p. 6, 1. 10; R-8, para 4). Defendants' empioyeP, 
Wilma G. Alexander, inspected the premises ·within one-
half to one hour before plaintiff was injured and specifi-
cally inspected the floor and public toilet, finding all in 
order. She left and went home (R-8, para. 7). Plaintiff 
was on defendants' premises for approximately one-half 
hour (Depo., p. 11, 1. 22). Other custornf'rs entered while 
she was there (Depo., p. 18). When she entered, she saw 
a small spot of water approximately one foot in diameter 
in one corner (Depo., p. 13, 1. 5). \Yilma Alexander's 
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telephone number was posted in a conspicuous place on 
the premises with notice to telephone her in the event of 
an emergency, but no one advised her of any defect in 
the premises and she did not learn of the water on the 
premises until after plaintiff fell on leaving the premises 
(R-8, para. 6-7). While plaintiff was on the premises, 
some unknown customer or member of the public, but 
not an employee, put too much toilet paper in the public 
toilet and it overflowed (R-8., para. 8), leaving water 
one-fourth to one-half inch deep around the exit from 
the premises ( Depo., p. 14, 1. 30). Plaintiff started to 
walk out of the premises following her daughter, carry-
ing a large laundry basket (Depo., p. 17-18). Because 
of the basket she could not see the floor as she walked, 
could not see her feet at all (Depo., p. 16, 1. 18), could 
not see where she was walking, and was not making any 
particular effort to look to see where she was walking, 
but was looking straight ahead (Depo., p. 22). She did 
not see the water that had overflowed from the toilet, 
took three stPps into it, (Depo., p. 17, 1. 21) felt the 
water through her shoes (Depo., p. 20, 1. 4), said "be 
careful" to her daughter and slipped and fell in the 
water (Depo., p. 16, 1. 24), causing her injury. ·when 
plaintiff fell, "Wilma G. Alexander was called on the 
telephone. She cairn~ immediately to the premises, in-
spected, and found that the water on the floor was 
ennsed by an excessive amount of toilet paper clogging 
tlw toilet which caused it to overflow (R-8, para. 7-8). 
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Plaintiff testified she did not know how the water 
got there (Depo., p. 15, 1. 6), how long it had been there 
(Depo., p. 20, 1. 1), or whether any of defendants or 
their employees knew of it (Depo., p. 22, 1. 26). Plaintiff 
was given opportunity to produce additional facts when 
her deposition was taken but did not do so (Depo., p. 48, 
1. 13-18). 
As the sole basis for negligence, plaintiff's amended 
complaint, paragraph 4, alleges: 
" ... Defendants and each of them, nPgligently 
and carelessly and ·without due regard for the 
safety of their patrons, and the public permitted 
a. slippery and foreign substance to be present 
on the floor of defendants' Laundromat, .... " 
(R-4) (Emphasis added). 
Based upon that sole allegation of negligence in the 
complaint, plaintiff's deposition, the Alexander affidavit 
(R-8) and plaintiff's notice of readiness for trial (R-7), 
defendants moved for summary judgment (R-9). 
Plaintiff filed no responsive affidavits. The motion 
was published and the case taken under advisement to 
permit the filing of briefs, although def Pndants had al-
ready filed their brief (R-10). Not until Septembe>r 27, 
15 days after hearing of the motion, did plaintiff filP an 
affidavit stating only "thPre is 110 drain facility in the 
public bathroom located on the pn'rnises.'' 
The Trial Court granted defendants' motion for 
smmnary judgment and mrnrded defendants judgment 
in their favor and costs (R-14). Plaintiff appealed. 
Incidentally, plaintiff's brief in its statement of facts, 
page 3, claims Mrs. Alexander contradicted herself, say-
ing she said in her affidavit the premises had a telephone 
with her number listed on a card near it, but in her 
answers to interrogatories she admitted there was no 
telephone on the premises. Plaintiff is wholly inaccurate. 
Tlw Alexander affidavit (R-S, para. 6) says: 
"On the coin dwngcrs located in a conspicu-
ous place on tht' premises appears a sign which 
givt>s either depondent's telephone number or 
1\Trs. Greer's tPlephone number .... On November 
14, 1963, affiant 's name and telephone number 
were so posted." 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. RES IPSA LOQUITUR IS NOT APPLICABLE. 
62 ALR 2d 57, sa:rn : 
"It is univrrsnll.11 hdd that the res ipsa 
loqnitur doctri1w is i11applicable to ~u~ts .against 
bnsin<'SS proprietors to recover for mJunes sus-
taim'd in falls on floors within the business prem-
isl'S which are allt>ged to have been rendered 
slipiwry hy the 1n·psence .thereon of water, or 
rnnd, snow, t>tc." (Emphasis added) 
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61 ALR 2d 58 says exactly the same thing with 
regard to litter and debris. Thirty cases from ten juris-
dictions are cited bv the two annotations . . 
The res ipsa elements which must be present are: 
"(1) 'That the accident was a kind which, in 
the ordinary course of events, would not have 
happened had due care been observed; (2) that 
it happened irrespective of any participation by 
the plaintiff; and (3) that the cause thereof was 
something under the management or control of 
the defendant, or for which it is responsible." 
Wightmarn v. Mt. Fuel Supply Co., 5 Ut. 2d 373, 
302 P.2d 471. 
The doctrine is not applicable here. First, plaintiff has 
not shown toilets overflow without any negligence. Sec-
ond, plaintiff did participate, for she walked in the 
water. Third, plaintiff has not shown the toilet was 
exclusively in defendants' control; it was instead a public 
toilet, used and operated by the public. Finally, df'-
fendants have explained and rebutted any possible inf er-
ence of negligence by showing that the water came from 
an overflowing toilet overstuffed by someone other than 
defendants or their employees. 
In Barnhill v. Young Electric Sign Co., 13 Ut.2d 347, 
37 4 P.2d 311, plaintiff claimed rrs ipsa, but this Court 
said: 
"Where it is clear that it is at least equally 
probable that the negligence was that of anoth<•I', 
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the court must instruct the jury that the plaintiff 
has not proved his case. The injury must be 
traced to a specific instrumentality or cause for 
which defendant was responsible." 
W clch v. Sears Roebuck Co., (Cal. 1950) 215 P.2d 
796, stresst>d at page 4 of plaintiff's brief, is scarcely in 
point. There a roll of linoleum fell on plaintiff after 
defendant's clerk had unrolled it, snapped it back into the 
roll, and left to answer the telephone. That is a classical 
res ipsa situation, for things normally don't usually fall 
without negligence by persons in control. Here it was 
plaintiff who fell, so if res ipsa applies at all, it is to 
plaintiff's contributory negligence. 
Knowles v. Hillside Lounge, Inc., 137 N.vV.2d 361, 
and Bell ·u. Koch, Inc. i·s. Stanley, 375 s.·W.2d 696, cited 
hy plaintiff's hrirf, page 7, are distinguishable because 
1l1<>y involw a collapsing chair and a falling stack of 
dry-wall shePts, respectively. Chairs don't usually break 
and things don't usually fall without negligence by per-
som; in control. Public toilets do overflow without negli-
f','<'nce h~' tlH' lando-wner. 
Rarca v. Daitch Crystal Dairies, Inc., 256 N.Y.S.2d 
I+, cited at page 7, is not a decision of the highest court 
of N<'W York, and while its dicta takes a view of the 
n,p1)licahility of res ipsa to supermarkets which is con-
trary to that tak<'n by any other court, the case is actually 
d(•<·i<l<>d on other grounds. 'l1 he case s:\YS: 
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" ... aside from any question of res ipsa, the 
proof of the condition of the spilled sugar -
numerous foot tracks through it, etc. - presented 
a question of fact on the issue of constructive 
notice and was not an absence of notice as a 
matter of law case, as the trial court indicated." 
Sanone v. J. C. Penney Co., 17 Ut.2d 4fi, 404 P.2d 
248, cited at page 7, is not in point. '11here plaintiff 
caught her foot in an escalator while halfway down it. 
The Court held n•s ipsa applied, saying: 
"Nor does it depart from reason to draw the 
inference that if an escalator is so used (in the 
manner intended) and that an injury occurs there 
was something wrong either in the construction, 
maintenance, or operation of the escalator .... 
Inasmuch as the escalator was under the exclusiw 
control of the defendant, the test for the applica-
tion of the doctrine is fulfilled." 
Had plaintiff there slipped on \rnter on thP escalator, 
rPs ipsa would not havP appliPd. 
Thus, it is cfoar rPs ipsa is not applicable against 
landownPrs in the case of toilets OJH-'l'<Lted and usPd by 
the public, hPcause the public may causP thPm to overflow. 
POINT II. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING 
AS A MATTER OF LAW DEFENDANTS WERE NOT NEGLI-
GENT. 
The discovPr.v tools and affidavits prn]H'rly before 
the Court clParly show that defrnd~mtc: n·nso11alily <'xer-
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cised their duty of inspection and had no notice of the 
existence of the 'vater on ·which plaintiff fell. They 
show the condition was created by someone other than 
defendants or their employees. They show that plaintiff 
has no knowledge of and cannot show how the water 
got on the floor, by ·whom it was deposited, how it arrived 
there or that defendants had knowledge of its presence. 
Since plaintiff testified she was in the premises for 
about one-half hour and that the condition did not exist 
when she entered, the record affirmatively shows that 
the condition existed for something less than one-half 
hour. Absent evidence to the contrary, the condition 
could have been created only seconds before plaintiff 
foll and speculation as to "'hen it was created is pro-
hihik<l. 
In Lhz,dsay v. Eccles Hotel Co., 3 Ut.2d 364, 284 
P.2d 477 ( 1955), plaintiff, after dining in defendant's 
coffpe shop, sli.pped on a small quantity of water which 
somehow got on the floor some time after she was seated. 
'l111is Court affim1ed a directed verdict for defendant in 
the absence of evidence "as to how the water got onto 
the floor, by whom it was deposited, exactly when it 
arrived there, or that defendant had knowledge of its 
presence.'' 
Erickson v. Walgreen Drng Co., 120 U. 31, 232 P.2d 
:210 (1951) and De Weese v. J.C. Penney Co., 5Ut.2d116, 
:2!)7 P.2d 898 (1956), distinguish situations of conditions 
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created by landowners, where plaintiff need not show 
defendant's notice, from situations involving transitory 
hazards, as here, when plaintiff must show defendant 
knew or should have knmvn of the hazard and had 
reasonable opportunity to correct it. 
In Hampton v. Roicley, 10 Ut.2d 169, 350 P.2d 161 
(1960) plaintiff slipped on a loose stone on the doorstep 
of defendant's store. This Court said: 
"In regard to a transitory condition of the 
character here involved, the instruction given is 
consistent with established law that in order to 
find the defendants negligent, it must be shown 
that they either knew, or in the exercise of reason-
able care should have known, of any hazardous 
condition and had a rPasonable opportunity to 
remedy the same.'' 
In 61 A.L.R 2d 125-6, the annotator says: 
"In contrast with the rule applicable to a 
floor condition resulting from the act of the pro-
prietor or his employees, it is ht•ld that \Ylier<' 
it appears that a floor in a store or similar placP 
of business has been made dangerous by the pres-
ence thereon of an ohstacle and the presenee of 
the obstacle is tracPable to iwrsons for whom the 
proprietor is not responsihlP, proof that thP pro-
prietor was negligent in relation to tlw floor 
condition requires a showing that he had actual 
noticP thereof or that the eondition PxistPd for 
such a 10ngtl; of time that in tlH• <'X!'reis<' of 
rPasonahle car<' hP shoulcl han· known of it." 
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In J. C. Penney, Inc. v. Kellermeyer (Ind. 1939) 
1!) N.E.2d 882, 22 N.E.2d 899, plaintiff claimed defendant 
was negligent in maintaining a foreign object on the 
floor of its store. A verdict for the plaintiff was re-
versed as a matter of law on the ground that there was 
no evidence that the object was on the floor for any 
length of time whatever or that defendant or its servants 
knew it was on the floor, or, because of the length of 
time it was there, in the exercise of reasonable care, 
dl'fendants should have known about it. 
In Robinson v. Grcnt Atlantic and Paci[ ic Tea Co. 
(N.C. 19-1-1), 1-17 S.\V.2d 648, a verdict for plaintiff was 
reversed as a matter of law when it appeared that a box 
over which plaintiff tripped in defendant's grocery store 
"'as not in the passageway when plaintiff entered the 
stor<> some 10 to 15 minutes before she fell, the court 
saying that the box was not in the passageway for suffi-
eit>nt length of time to charge defendant with constructive 
notice of the obstruction. 
Jn Gargaro 1·. Kroger Grocery and Baking Co. 
(Tenn. 193S) 118 S.\V.2d 561, it was held the trial court 
did not err in dismissing plaintiff's suit, saying that 
proof that tlw basket owr which plaintiff tripped had 
n•rnaint>d in the aisle of the store from 20 to 30 minutes 
prior to plaintiff's accident "·as not sufficient to charge 
1ld'Pndant with notice that the baskt>t was in the aisle so 
1 liat defrndant 's failnrt> to remove it could be considered 
11vgl igencP. 
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Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel, J. C. Penney v. Keller-
meyer, Robinson v. Great Atlarntic and Pacific Te.a, Co. 
and Gargaro v. Kroger Grocery, supra, all hotel, depart-
ment store or supermarket cases, as opposed to this 
self-service laundry, hold that absence of evidence as 
to how long the transitory condition existed, or evidence 
that it existed for 15 minutes, or 30 minutes, will not 
charge defendant with failure to discover within a 
reasonable time as a m.atter of law. 
Here involved is a self-service laundry where em-
ployees are not customarily present. The overflowing 
water could not have existed for longer than one-half 
hour. Plaintiff cannot show it existed even that long; 
it might have been only seconds. There can be no ques-
tion that, as a matter of law as established by the fore-
going cases, defendant did not unreasonably fail to dis-
cover the water. 
Plaintiff's brief, page 10, claims plaintiff's deposi-
tion at page 15 presents evidence that the water came 
from the plumbing beneath the toilet instead of from 
overflow. Not only is this gross conjecture; it is incom-
petent hearsay. The deposition, page 15, reflects that 
plaintiff didn't know where the water came from, that 
some unidentified person told her it came from the bot-
tom of the toilet and plaintiff and her counsel said: 
"A. That's hearsay. 
13 
MR. HUGGINS: That's right." 
Such is hardly a showing "made on personal knowledge" 
of "facts as would be admissible in evidence" by an 
affiant "competent to testify" thereto as required by 
Rule 56 ( e), U.R.C.P. If plaintiff really wanted to claim 
water came from below the toilet, she should have pre-
sented a counter-affidavit in proper form to rebutt the 
Alexander affidavit that after learning of the accident 
and the water on the floor, "Affiant then inspected the 
premises and found that the toilet had overflowed be-
cause an excessive amount of toilet paper had plugged 
up the bowl." 
Plaintiff's brief makes no effort to distinguish the 
applicable Utah cases, although they were cited in de-
fendants' memorandum to the Trial Coµrt (R-60). The 
cases from other jurisdictions cited by plaintiff, while 
not controlling, are all distinguishable. 
Plaintiff's brief, page 10, cites Newman v. United 
States, 248 Fed. Supp. 669. It is not in point. It involves 
negligent installation by defendant of a water line. As 
indicated by the Utah cases cited, supra, when defendant 
or its employees actively create the condition complained 
of, plaintiff need not show that defendant knew or should 
have known of the condition and had a reasonable oppor-
tunity to remedy it, for defendant's knowledge is pre-
:-:nnwd. The summary judgment is here based upon the 
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grounds that the water was a transitory condition and 
plaintiff cannot show any evidence that defendants 
created it, knew of it or had a reasonable opportunity 
to remove it. Absent such evidence, summary judgment 
is proper. The Newman case does not even reach this 
point. 
Robinson v. Park Central Apartments, (DDC. 1965) 
248 F.Supp.6321, cited at page 10 of plaintiff's brief, is 
not in point for there defendants' employees had been 
clearing away snow on the approach to the hotel but 
stopped, and so defendants were shown to have known 
of the condition. Here plaintiff cannot show defendants' 
knowledge. 
Likewise, in Control Hardware Co. v. Statler, 180 So. 
2d 205, page 11, plaintiff's brief, defendant actively cre-
ated the condition complained of by placing a mat with 
a defective edge on the sidewalk and not adequately 
lighting it. Since the owner created the condition, plain-
tiff need not show defendant's knowledge of the condi-
tion. 
Moore v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 173 So.2d 603, 
cited page 11, plaintiff's brief, is not in point. There 
plaintiff presented evidence that the janitor improperly 
cleaned the supermarket floor and further showed that 
defendant employees improperly inspt>cted the floor two 
hours before the accident by failing to discover the pres-
ence of the drying hanana pe('l. Here, then• is no evi-
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dence of improper inspection and indeed, there is 
affirmative evidence showing inspection about one-half 
hour before plaintiff fell and slrnwing that the condition 
complained of ·was caused by a third party and not by 
defendants' employees. Finally, the case at bar involves 
a self-service laundromat where (~mployees are custo-
marily not present rather than a supermarket where 
employees are constantly present. In any event, Lindsay 
r. Rcclrs llotel Co., s11pra, is controlling. 
Guidani v. Cwnerlato, (Ill., 1965) 207 N.E.2d 1, cited 
i1age 1 l, plaintiff's brief, is distinguishable. There the 
Court expressly holds that, because bowlers make a run-
ning and sliding approach in bowling, the foreseeable risk 
of injury is great, and a bmYling alley proprietor has a 
higher duty of inspecting and the reasonable length of 
time for discovering defects is shorter than in the com-
mon passageway of a retail store. Further, there was 
<>vidC'nre in that rase to indicate that the wet floor had 
v\:.iskd for more than one hour. In the case at bar it 
eannot he determined how long the floor had been wet, 
lmt it was less than a half-hour. 
Harvey B11ilcli11g, Inc. v. Halley, (Fla. 1965) 175 
No.2d 780, ('ited at page 1 l, is distinguishable. There, it 
was raining and plaintiff, who slipped on the marble 
floor in the office building, offt>red affidavits in opposi-
tion to clefrndant's motion for summary judgment stat-
ing "the flo01· was of marble construction and was \Yet, 
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causing it to be slippery." Summary judgment was there 
denied, because defendants' knowledge of the condition 
could be implied from knowledge of the rain itself and 
that marble becomes particularly slippery when wet. 
Here, there is no way constructive kno''Tledge of the 
overflowing toilet can be imputed to defendants, partic-
ularly when it cannot be shown when the toilet over-
flowed. The case actually supports defendants, for it 
says: 
"To def eat a motion (for summary judgment) 
which is supported by evidence which reveals no 
genuine issue, it is not sufficient for the opposing 
party merely to assert that an issue does exist. 
(It is a) pretrial motion for a directed verdict." 
The court disapproved a lower court's holding that "sum-
mary judgment should not be granted if it could be 
inferred from the evidence that the plaintiff could prove 
at trial that defendant was negligent," and approves 
another lower holding taking the opposite view that the 
opposing party "must come forward with facts contra-
dicting those submitted by the movant and demonstrating 
a real issue between the parties." Here plaintiff has 
so failed. 
Mu'ff"phy v. El Dorado Bowl, Inc., (Ariz. 1965) 407 
P.2d 57, cited page 12, plaintiff's brief, is distinguishabh• 
as a bowling alley case, considering the higher duty of 
care of bowling alleys owners. See G11ida11i v. Cwncrlatn. 
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suzna. Further, the case involved a construction defect 
(a step) for which notice need not be shown rather than 
a transitory condition created by a third party. 
General Electric v. Salcidio, Ariz. 408 P.2d 42, cited 
page 12, plaintiff's brief, is distinguishable solely upon 
the quotation from plaintiff's brief that "plaintiff does 
uot have to prove actual or constructive notice of defec-
tive floor condition, where defect is created by defendant 
or his servants." 
Ga·rrctt v. American Air Lines, Inc. (C. A. 5th, 1964) 
;);)2 F.2d 939, cited page 13, plaintiff's brief, is not 
applieahle. The cas<• acknowlf·dges that normally the 
earrier has "no liability unless (a) the carrier has put 
tlw zipp<•r hag on tlw floor, or (b) the carrier knew it 
was on the floor, or ( e) it had been there so long that 
tlw carrier was charged with knowledge of its presence 
arnl l'onsequent duty to n'move it." The case adds a 
fourth basis for finding liability in holding that the 
c·arrif'l' must take reasonable cognizance of the habits 
and practices g<>nerally followed hy its customers. In 
that easl·, the earri<T "acknowledged that passengers 
j'INJll<'Jifly put bagµ:age on the floor in front of their 
f'PPt." Jlpn•, tlwre is no evidence that patrons might 
frer1urntly cause the toild to overflow, and indeed the 
Comt ean tnkt> judicial notice that such does not 
(1rh·n linpJH'l1. Furth<·r, the case is distinguishable bP-
<·att:-><' of tlw highest standard of care attributable to 
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carriers rather than the duty of reasonable care attrib-
utable to landowners, as here. The case actually sup-
ports defendants' motion, for here there is no evidence 
that defendants put the water on the floor, knew that it 
was on the floor, or that it had been there so long that 
defendants werf' chargf'd with knowlf'dgf' of its presPncP. 
Deniswich v. Pappas (R.I. 1964) 198 A.2d 144, cited 
page 14, plaintiff's brief, is distinguishable. The case 
arose when the trial court sustained defendant's de-
murrer to the complaint in spite of an allegation that 
defendants breached the alleged custom of parking lot 
owners to build barriers in the parking lot. The ease 
involves an active construction defect by defendant, for 
which notice need not be shown. Here, there is no con-
struction defect shown and no evidence that defendants 
breached any rustom. 
Bozza v. Vornado, Inc. (N.J., 1964) 200 A.2d 7'77, 
cited page 14, plaintiff's brief, is not in point and is 
contrary to Utah law as stated in Lindsay v. Eccles 
Hotel Co., supra. In Bozza, plaintiff fell in litter on a 
cafeteria floor, and the Court said: 
"When plaintiff has shown that the circum-
stances were such to create the reasonable prob-
ability that the dangerous condition would occur, 
he need not also prove actual or constructive 
notice of the sp<-'cific condition. Factors bearing 
on the existPnce of such rPasonable prohahility 
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would inc~~de the nature of the business, the gen-
eral cond1t10n of the premises, a pattern of con-
duct or recurring incidents. . . . Once plaintiff 
introduces evidence which raises an inference 
of negligence, defendant may then negate the in-
ference by submitting evidence of reasonable 
rare." 
Here there is no evidence of reasonable probability that 
the toilet would overflow, or how long the condition 
existed, and here defendants did show evidence of reason-
able care in inspecting the premises a half-hour before 
plaintiff fell. Finally, in considering whether plaintiff 
must here prove actual or constructive notice of the 
specific condition is to be considered the fact that this 
is a self-service laundry where employees are not nor-
mally present, as opposed to the cafeteria in Bozza where 
they are present. 
The same distinction can be made of Mahoney v. J. C. 
Pemney Co. (N.M., 1962), 37'7 P.2d 663, cited plaintiff's 
brief, page 15. Plaintiff paraphrased the language of 
the court and left out the language which hurts her 
position. The actual quotation paraphrased is: 
"Where the dangerous condition is not an 
isolated one, bu.t is foreseeable because of a pat-
tern of conduct, a recurring incident, a general 
condition, or a continuing condition, then ... 
absent a. showing of due care, plaintiff need not 
provf' that defendant had actual or constructive 
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knowledge of the specific item forming part of 
that paUern of conduct, recurring incident, etc." 
(Emphasis added) 
Here, there is no slwwing that the overflo\ving toilet 
was not isolated, or was foreseeable because of the pat-
tern of conduct, a recurring incident, a general condition, 
or a continuing condition. In fact, the showing by de-
fendants is to the contrary. Further, there is an affirma-
tive showing of ins1wction, and henct', duP carp, on imrt 
of defendants. 
Plaintiff claims a jury might find defendants negli-
gent in leaving the self-service coin-01wratcd laundry un-
attended. This is not material in absence of showing by 
plaintiff as to how long the wakr had bren on the floor, 
so as to show that had the premises been attended the-
overflow could hav<' heen discoverPd. Further, ~lrs. Alex-
ander did inspect one-half to one hour lwforp she lParned 
plaintiff fell (R-8), so lack of an attendant eannot matt<>r. 
Speculation as to how long the water existPd is pro-
hibited, for tlw toilPt could have overflowed jnst as 
plaintiff left. Since the watf'r wasn't ther<' 1yJwn plain-
tiff went in and she was there onlv one-half hour, it 
could not have he(m th('re long<'r tlian one-half hour. 
It is interesting that iilaintiff hersf'lf was attending the 
premiRes and slie didn't discovPr th<' water. Plai11tiff 
testified other patrons enfored th<' prernist>s alrnnt fiw 
minutes hefore she fell (Depo., p. 1S) and plaintiff still 
did not learn of tlie wafrr. Tf it lind lH'<'n tliPn' 1011~'.·. 
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wouldn't someone have mentioned it~ Hence, the reason-
able probability is that the toilet did overflow just as 
plaintiff left and therefore the presence of an employee 
would have made no difference. 
Plaintiff's brief quarrels with the Alexander affi-
davit that employees are customarily not present in self-
service laundries (R-8), saying the evidence is incompe-
tent. Again, the customary absence of employees in self-
service laundries is a matter of common knowledge of 
which the Court can take judicial notice, if the cus-
tom is not shown purely by definition of "self-service 
laundry". Further, who is more competent to so testify 
than one in the self-service laundry business. If plaintiff 
disputed the affidavit showing the custom, she should 
have filed a counter-affidavit to create an issue of fact. 
Ra.msey v. Mellon National Bank (W.D. Pa. 1966), 
251 F. Supp. 646 cited by plaintiff's brief, page 9, is 
distinguishable on the same ground that court distin-
guished the prior holding in Y eiarsly v. American Stores 
Co. (1929) 97 Pa. Super. 275. In Ramsey there was 
conflicting evidence as to the business custom (customary 
size of holes in floor mats) but in Year sly, plaintiff failed 
to show the grating in which she caught her heel had 
unusually large holes and was non-suited. So here, as 
in Y parsly, plaintiff failed to show any competent evi-
dence of a custom of having employees present at all 
times in self-sf'rvice laundries and thus failed to contra-
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diet defendants' affidavit. Colli,qan v. City of Mo11m1-
gahela (Pa. 1922) 115 A. 8(i9, cited at 1iage 9 of plaintiff':-: 
brief, has nothing at all to do with the issues hert>. 
This all comes down to a simplP proposition. In 
cases of transitory conditions, imch as water ovPrflow-
ing from toilt~ts, in Utah, a plaintiff is rNJUired to present 
evidence, quoting from Lindsay v. f,'ccl<'s Hotel, supra, 
"as to how the water got onto thP floor, by whom it was 
deposited, exaetly wlwn it arrived thC'r<', or that dP-
fendant had knowledge of its presenee." Plaintiff testi-
fied on depm;ition she did not know tlw ansm•rs to thosP 
four questions. On defpndants' motion for srnmnar~­
judgment, hPr sworn testimony alone that she did not 
know those answ<'rs \\-ould nee<'ssitate hPr prodncing 
other affidavih; to answPr the questions to avoid sum-
mary judgi1wnt. ~lw did not pn•sf'nt sneh affidavits. 
Instead, defondants WPnt a st(--p further and af'f'inna-
tively showed the watPr ealll(' from a toi](•t eaus<'<l to 
overflow by a patron and defendants' ('lllploy(•ps did not 
know of its pr<•sPne<>. 
In light of that record and th<• controlling l Ttah eases 
of Lindsay r. Eccles Hotrl and llm111;to11 11• Rowle,11. 
supra., it is elPar tl1e '!'rial Court did 1wt <'IT in holdi11g 
there ,,-as no g<>nnine issup of rnat<'rial faet, tlint as a 
matter of hrw defendants \H'l'l' not 1H•µ;lig·('llt ancl in 
granting snumuHy judg-rn<·nt. 
POINT III. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING 
AS A MATTER OF LAW PLAINTIFF WAS NEGLIGENT. 
The record affirmatively shows from plaintiff's own 
deposition that the water of which she co"mplains was 
large, open and obvious. It was a fourth to a half-inch 
deep around the exit (Depo., p. 14). Plaintiff's brief 
(page 4) calls it an "extensive inundation." As plaintiff 
walked, she carried a basket which she knew prevented 
her from seeing her feet or the floor (Depo., p. 16). She 
had seen some water on the floor when she entered 
( Depo., p. 13). Even though she had seen that water 
and even though knew she could not see her feet or the 
floor, she testified she looked straight ahead and made 
no particular effort to see where she was walking (Depo., 
p. 22). Although plaintiff's brief argues plaintiff had 
no notice of the water and is therefore excused, to the 
contrary, she testified she took three steps into the 
water, and then told her daughter "be careful." There-
fore she was then aware of the hazard and having thus 
acquired notice of the condition she slipped and fell. 
Hence, she was contributorily negligence as a matter 
of law, first in not watching where she was walking 
when she knew she could not see the floor, second, in 
entering the clearly visible large area of water, and 
third, in not using reasonable care to avoid falling after 
she was aware of the hazard. 
In Whitmarn v. W. T. Grant Co., 16 Ut.2d 81, 395 
I' .2d 918 ( 1964), the granting of summary judgment on 
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the ground of contributory negligence was sustained 
when a deliveryman (an invitee, Restatement of Torts 
2d §332), in returning to his truck, opened the first door 
he saw and stepped off backwards into an elevator shaft 
without taking a precautionary glance beyond the door. 
This Court said : 
"The plaintiff is confronted with the basic 
proposition that where there is a hazard which 
is plainly visible, ordinarily one is charged with 
the duty of seeing and avoiding it. And if he fails 
to do so, it is concluded that he was negligent 
either in failing to look, or in failing to heed 
what he saw .... In order to justify holding that 
a jury question as to negligence exists, where 
injury has resulted from an o bserva,ble hazard, 
it is essential that there be something which could 
be regarded as tending to distract the plaintiff's 
attention or to prevent him from seeing the 
danger, thus providing some reasonable basis for 
a finding that even though he exercised due care, 
he could be excused from seeing and avoiding it. 
Here, there is no evidence by plaintiff of any dis-
traction. Plaintiff cannot say the basket prevented her 
from seeing the hazard, for she knew that she could not 
see the floor but made no effort to see around the basket. 
Further, carrying the basket was her own a.ct; it cannot 
be said that defendants or any outside agency prevented 
her from seeing. 
In Moore v. Kroger Co., (Ga. 1953) 74 SE.2d 481, 
plaintiff tripped over a push cart in the aisle in defend-
ant's self-service grocery store, her vision having been 
obscured by a large sack of groceries which she was 
carrying in her arms. A general demurrer to the peti-
tion was sustained, the court holding that the proximate 
cause of plaintiff's injuries was her failure to exercise 
ordinary care for her own safety in looking ahead in 
the direction in which she was walking. 
Plaintiff's brief, page 16, argues that defendants 
knew or should have known the customers will carry 
baskets and that it is foreseeable that a customer will 
not see temporary hazards in his way. It certainly isn't 
foreseeable that customers will not make any effort to 
see around their baskets to observe clearly visible haz-
ards. If the risk is foreseeable for defendants, it is 
equally foreseeable for plaintiff. The record is clear 
that plaintiff, notwithstanding foreseeability, was not 
making any effort to look to see where she was walking 
though she knew she could not see where she was walk-
ing or see the floor (Depo., page 22). Such evidence does 
not make a question for the jury as a matter of law. 
Thus, plaintiff is in exactly the same position as was 
plaintiff in Whitman v. W. T. Grant Co., and in Moore 
v. Kroger Co., supra, both of which held plaintiff was 
negligent as a matter of law. 
Plaintiff makes no effort to distinguish the con-
trolling Whitman case. The cases cited by plaintiff, 
while not controlling, are all distinguishable. 
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Plaintiff's brief, page 16, cites Kreiss v. Altima 
Laundry, Inc., (Ga., 1963), 133 So.2d 602. The case is 
not in point, for the issue there was whether plaintiff 
selected the proper route. Here defendants do not claim 
plaintiff used an improper route, but that she failed to 
look where she was walking. 
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Stephens (D.C., 1964), 197 
A.2d 849, cited at page 16, is distinguishable from this 
case on the same grounds that the court there distin-
guished its prior holding in Safeu·ny Stores, Inc. v. Fen-
ney (1960) 163 A.2d 624. In Stephens, plaintiff testifi<>d 
she was proceeding in a careful manner, although hur-
riedly, whereas in Fenney, plaintiff encountered the 
danger "automatically and in an absent-minded and for-
getful manner." Here, plaintiff was contributorily negli-
gent as a matter of law, as in Fenney, in failing to ob-
serve a plainly visible hazard. There is no evidence hPre 
that plaintiff was proceeding carefully, as in Stephens; 
the evidence here is that she could not see the floor or 
where she was walking and was not making any partic-
ular effort to see, as in Fenney. 
Dever v. Theriot's, Inc. (iLa., 1964 ), 159 So.2d 602, 
is improperly paraphrased in plaintiff's favor at page 
17 of her brief. The omissions from the sentence show 
the distinction. The actual quotation varaphrased is that 
plaintiff, who frll in a supermarket, was not guilty of 
contributory negligent "in failing to obserw inconspicu-
ous particles or substanees in the ais]C'," and it 1vas not 
necessary to make "a specific observation of floor con-
ditions before taking each step, especially in view of 
the storekeeper's presumed intention and knowledge that 
the customer will devote the major portion of his .aitten-
tion to inspecting the merchandise deliberately displayed 
to attract it." Here, the hazard was not inconspicuous, 
and this was an accident in a self-service laundromat, 
where the record is devoid of evidence of displays or 
any other distractions. 
Plaintiff's brief, page 17, cites Garofoli v. Salesi-
anum School, Inc., (Del. 1965) 208 A.2d 308. The case 
is distinguishable on the same grounds that the Court 
distinguished its prior holding in Freileck v. H omeo-
pathic Hospital Association, 150 A.2d 17. In Garofoli 
there was evidence that plaintiff was proceeding care-
fully, and hence a jury question existed. In Freileck, 
plaintiff was held negligent as a matter of law in falling 
over a chain on a foggy night where "there was nothing 
to indicate that plaintiff had been watching carefully 
where she was going.'' Here, the only evidence affirma-
tively slwws that plaintiff was not watching carefully 
where she was going, so Fre1"leck, not Garofoli, applies. 
Further, in Garof oli, there was evidence of poor lighting 
not here present. 
Plaintiff's brief, page 17, cites Robinson v. Park 
Central Apartments, (D.C. 1965) 248 F.Supp. 632. There 
a:,; plaintiff stepped from a taxi, he slipped on ice cover-
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ing the sidewalk left after defendant cleared snow. The 
United States District Court, a single judge, said ''I do 
not believe he was under any duty to look down on the 
street before he got out of the taxicab and ascertain 
the exact state of the street. It looked clear because 
there was no snow piled on it." (Emphasis added) The 
case is distinguishable because there plaintiff looked but 
could not see the hazard and was held not bound to 
ascertain the exact state of the hazard, but here plaintiff 
did not look at all to see what was clearly visible' and 
though she knew she could not see the floor, she stepped 
fon,·ard any-v.·ay. 
Plaintiff's brief, page 18, cites Blacldmrn 'V. Toml1-
ling, (Colo., 1965) 407 P.2d 337. That cast' is distinguish-
able because there plaintiff's view of the step between 
the hotel door and street level was obstructed hy tlw 
door and the lighting. The court said, "one fully exer-
cising due care could fail to observe the difference· 
hetween the hotel and strPd levPls." In Blacklnm1, 
plaintiff was prevented from seeing by conditions cre-
ated by defendant, that is, the door and the poor light. 
Here the hazard was larg(~ and clearly visible; nothing 
but plaintiff's own basket prevented her from seemg, 
and plaintiff here did not exercise due care. 
The recalling of the Court's attention to TVhitman 
v. lV. T. Gr:rmt Co., supra, a Utah 19G4 case, whiclt 
plaintiff has not attPmpted to distinguish, and tlw pn~­
ceding distinctions of defendants' c<1~'<'S an' sufficient 
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answer to plaintiff's brief, page 18, that "the cases cited 
by defendants in support of their contributory negligence 
allegation are, as is obvious, old cases, not in point, and 
at the present time not good law." 
Clearly, plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law 
and the Trial Court did not err in so ruling. 
POINT IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The sole ground of negligence alleged in the amend-
(•d complaint is that "defendants . . . negligent and 
carPlessly ... permitted a slippery and foreign sub-
stance to be present on the floor of defendants' laundro~ 
mat. ... '' ( R-4, para 4). Plaintiff filed notice of readi-
ness for trial and her counsel certified therein he had 
interviPwPd all known witnesses he might call on trial, 
that all use> of rules of discovery as necessary had been 
compl<'tPd, that he was ready for trial and that he "rf>-
quests thP court to act in reliance thereon." 
At that voint, the verified discovery tools before 
tlw Court showed that plaintiff claimed the slippery 
suht;hmeP on the floor was water in great quantity 
(Df'po., p. 9), that she didn't know how it go there, how 
Ionµ; it had hPen tlwre or whether any of defendants' 
Prnplo>·N·s kiww of it ( Dt>po., p. 15, 20, 22). The water 
"asn't tlwn• when plaintiff went in and she was there 
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only one-half hour ( Depo., p. 11). Defendants' affidavit 
sho\\·ed they inspected the premises one-half to one hour 
before plaintiff was injured and all ~was in order, that 
no employee was present while plaintiff was present, 
that no employee kne>v of the wat<'r and that the water 
came from a toilet whieh overflowed bf'cause a customer 
put too much papPr in the toilet (R-8). The record 
affirmatively shmn'd the water was not caused by de-
fendants but by a nwmber of the pnhlic, that dPfendants 
did not know of it, that it was transitory eondition and 
that defendants did not unreasonably fail to discovPr it. 
All this showed plaintiff could not provr• "defend-
ants ... negligently ... 1wrmittt>d a slippery and foreign 
subs tanee to be present on the floor," as alk•gecl and 
affirmativ<'ly showed <lefendants wPn' not negligent and 
plaintiff was. 
Based on that reeord and plaintiff's notic<-> of l'Ptu1i-
n<->ss for trial, def<'ndants moved for sn1111nary judgment. 
Plaintiff filed no rounl<'r-affidavits 11d01·<~ hearing of 
the motion but fifteen clays aftPr ]waring sPned aml 
filed an affidavit that there was no drain facility in 
defendants' bath mom. 'l'hough plaintiff's amended com-
plaint alleged only that dl'fenclants nPglig<•ntl~- 1wn11itted 
a foreign su1Jstanc<~ io <>~ist a1Hl t11011gli plaintiff :-;uh-
mittE'd the motion to th<· Trial Court 011 tliat t!iPnry, 
plaintiff now arµ;ne:..; in Ji Pr h1·i(•f, pi,';(· :; : 
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" ... nor has defendant introduced any infor-
mation that the \Yater on the floor was being 
properly eliminated by the drain installed on 
defendants' premises." 
Thus plaintiff, on appeal, attempts on the basis of 
her untimely affidavit to shift her theory from negli-
grnce in permitting water on the floor to exist to negli-
gmce in installing and maintaining the plumbing, and 
says the Court erred in granting summary judgment. 
Plaintiff's argument fails in a number of respects. 
Rule 56(c), U.R.C.P., requires that opposing affi-
davits he served prior to the day of hearing of motions 
for summary judgment. Plaintiff's affidavit was 15 days 
late, and plaintiff failed to obtain leave to file it. The 
affidavit thus should not be considered by the Court. See 
Surkin v. Clwrteris (C.A. 5th, 1952), 197 F.2d 77. 
Tlw mere fact of no drain in the bathroom does not, 
of itself, constitute negligence, for there is no evidence 
that the standard of care requires such. "The whole 
purpose of summary judgment would be defeated if a 
easP could be forced to trial by a mere assertion that 
an issue exists." LeiningPr v. Sterns-Roger 111/g. Co. 
(19G5) 17 Utah 2d 37, 404 P.2d 33. Scapecchi v. Harold's 
('l11l; (Nev., 1962) 371P.2d815, 818, holds: 
" ... it was not shown what caused (persons) 
to :-olip and no evidence was presented to show 
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that a terrazzo surface is inherently slippery 
when wet. The mere unverified allegations re-
garding the characteristics of a terrazzo surface 
did not present factual issues which would pre-
clude a summary judgment." 
Plaintiff must present some evidentiary material to con-
tradict defendants case or specify in an affidavit why 
she cannot do so. Dupler v. Yates (1960) 10 Utah 2d 251~ 
351 P.2d 624, specifically says : 
"Where, as in the instant case, the materials 
presented by the moving party are sufficient to 
entitle him to a directed verdict and the opposing 
party fails either to offer counter-affidavits or 
materials that raise a credible issue or to shmv 
that he has evidence not then available, summary 
judgment may be rendered for the moving 
party." 
In Heathman v. Fabian d!: Clendenin, 1-1- Ut.2d 60, 
377 P.2d 189, (1962), the granting of summary judg-
ment in a fraud case was sustained, the Court saying: 
''The evidence clearly shows that the trial 
judge carefully gave Heathman every opportun-
ity to show that he had been mistreated, or that 
there had been fraud or undue influence asserted 
in the Hatch case." 
Here, plaintiff might as well have said in her affi-
davit the laundromat had no fireplael' or that the floor 
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was asphalt tile. Neither statement, by itself, creates an 
issue of fact as to negligence; neither does the lack of 
a floor drain in the bathroom. Indeed, the Court can 
take judicial notice that seldom do bathrooms have floor 
drains, as that is a matter of common knowledge. Little 
Cottonwood Water Co. v. Kimball, 76 Ut. 2-±3, 267, 289 
P. 116. The lack of a floor drain cannot be causative, 
for plaintiff would still have fallen in water running to it. 
Rule 56(e), U.R.C.P., as amended, effective October 
1, 1965, providPs: 
"~When a motion for summary judgment is 
made and supported as provided in this rule, 
and adverse party may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or dPnials of his pleading, but his 
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided 
in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does 
not so respond, summary judgment, if appropri-
ate, shall be entPred against him.'' (Emphasis 
added) 
LindlJcrg t'. Backman (1959) 9 Ut.2d 58, 337 P.2d 
-1-33, upon ~which plaintiff relies, page 19, was decided 
lwfore Rule 56 ( e) was amended to provide as above. 
1'he rule now requires that plaintiff, facing defendant's 
affidavit (R-8) and her own deposition, furnish by affi-
davit or other verified discovery tools evidence that the 
laek of an OV('rflow drain in the bathroom constitutes 
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negligence, or that there was something wrong with the 
toilet or existing drain. She may not rely on her com-
plaint. 
The moving party on summary judgment is not 
required to negative every possible matter of defense. 
Best v. Bu.rch (Cal., 1955) 283 P .2d 262. Plaintiff sub-
mitted the case on the theory that defendants negligently 
permitted the water to be present and submitted no 
affidavits or other materials to show that there was 
anything wrong with the plumbing. No issue has ever 
been raised on that point. Plaintiff then argues on 
appeal that because there was no floor drain in the 
bathroom there could have been something wrong with 
the r-plumbing itself. Mere assertions or conjecture by 
plaintiff's counsel do not suffice. Dupler v. Ya,tes, 
Leininger v. Sterns-Rogers Mfg. Co., supra. 
Plaintiff's brief, page 19, says "nothing has been 
adduced or offered by defendants to indicate plaintiff 
could not sustain her burden of proof." On the con-
trary, plaintiff testified she did not know how the water 
got there, where it came from, who put it there or how 
long it had been there. That shows plaintiff cannot 
sustain her burden of proof, and on motion for summary 
judgment, she must then come forward with affidavits 
or other discovery tools showing a genuine issue of fact. 
She failed and the summary judgment i~ proper. 
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Plaintiff's brief, page 19, says "Questions of fact 
remain unanswered. What caused the hazard~" Facing 
defendants' affidavit of the cause, it is plaintiff who 
must answer that question to create an issue of fact, 
and failing to so do, summary judgment is proper. 
Plaintiff's brief, page 19, says "nothing indicates 
those questions, and others, could not be reasonably 
answered in plaintiff's favor at trial, and the record 
indiciates the availability of evidence which supports 
plaintiff's allegations." The record is in fact devoid of 
anything save counsel's conjecture. Plaintiff's brief, 
page 20, complains plaintiff was prevented from cross-
examining. On the contrary, plaintiff did submit inter-
rogatories (R-3) and plaintiff certified in notice of 
readiness for trial that all discovery had been completed 
(R-'7). Plaintiff's argument flies in the face of Utah 
eases cited, supra, and 35B C.J.S., Fed. Civ. Pr., §1198, 
]). Gl7 : 
"An affidavit of the party opposing summary 
judgment which merely suggests that a trial on 
the merits might develop facts from which the 
court might reach a particular conclusion does 
not raise a genuine issue of fact or indicate the 
existence of a substantial controversy; and asser-
tion by a party in his affidavits that at the trial 
he might produce further evidence does not pre-
clude granting of summary judgment on motion 
of the other party. 
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"Defendant cannot successfully oppose plain-
tiff's motion for summary judgment by asserting 
by his attorney's affidavit his right and need for 
cross-examination of plaintiff's ·witnesses on trial 
and credibility tests of witnesses of plaintiff on 
trial to develop his evidence to defeat plaintiff's 
complaint under the issues of the case, in the 
absence of showing that defendant had made a 
good faith earnest effort to present competent 
evidence of the fact, depositions, and exhibits in 
his possession or available to him by appropriate 
procedure and discovery action or reasonable 
investigation. The failure of plaintiff, against 
whom summary judgment was entered, to makr 
use of discovery procedure was destructive of hi& 
contention that he had not a sufficient oppor-
tunity to test the veracity of facts stated in thP 
supporting affidavits.'' 
Plaintiff's brief, page 20, suggests two inconsist-
encies in the Alexander affidavit, hut plaintiff is dead 
wrong on both. First, as pn~viously explained, the 
Alexander affidavit does not say there is a phone on 
the premises, it says her phone number was posted on 
a coin changer. Second, the mere reading of paragraphs 
7 and 8 of the AlexandPr affidavit (R-8) shows that on 
learning of the water on the floor, affiant "inspected 
the premises and found the toilet had overflowed." That 
clearly shows the ·water ::wurce. If plaintiff claims any 
other source, where is her affidavit sup1rnrting the claim? 
It seems that the Pntire reason for this aprwal 1:-
revealed on page 20 of plaintiff's hrit>f, \rhich sRys: 
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"The mere fact that an affiant states that 
she did examine the premises within thirty min-
utes prior to the accident, and that they were 
perfectly normal, and that some unknown person 
came in and stuffed the toilet is not sufficient 
Pvidence to disprove any allegation of negligence 
or to prevent plaintiff from cross-examining as 
to whether or not the facts stated in the affidavit 
were in fact true." 
Defendants submit that Rule 56(e), U.R.C.P., Lindsay v. 
Eccles Hotel, and Hampton v. Rowley, supra, show plain-
tiff is wrong and that summary judgment is here proper. 
Clearly, there is no basis on which summary judg-
ment can now be granted to plaintiff, for every case 
cited by plaintiff, even though distinguishable, says 
only that a jury question exists as to negligence and 
contributory negligence. 
CONCLUSION 
Apparently plaintiff agrees that the specific facts 
presented by affidavit and deposition merit the conclu-
sion that defendants were not negligent and that plain-
tiff was, for page 21 of plaintiff's brief says: 
"The law governing Summary Judgment can-
not be that a party may by affidavit, swear that 
he was not negligent, and by affidavit state that 
the opposing party \\'as neglige~t, . and l~ave th,~ 
Court accept this as competent, bmdmg evidence. 
38 
Defendants did not swear they "were not negligent" or 
that plaintiff "was negligent." Their affidavit merely 
recites the facts and plaintiff makes her own conclusion 
above quoted. D1:'fendants agree with plaintiff's con-
clusion. 
The verified discovery materials and affidavits be-
fore the Court not only show plaintiff cannot meet her 
burden of proving defendants were negligent, they also 
affirmatively show no negligence on the part of the 
defendants, and negligence on the part of the plaintiff. 
Plaintiff has testified she does not know how long the 
condition she complains of existed or how it was crl'ated. 
rrhere is no evidence that defendants failed within a 
reasonable time to discover tlw transitory condition cre-
ated by third parties. Plaintiff testified she was not mak-
ing any particular effort to see where she was walking, 
although she knew she could not see her feet and thr 
floor and as a result she failed to see and ·walked right 
into a large and obvious transitory condition. Plaintiff 
has not even attempted distinetions of the controlling 
Utah cases. Every single case cikd by plaintiff, all 
from other jurisdictions, is disting11ishable. Plaintiff 
has failed to set forth specific facts hy affidavit, or as 
otherwise provided in Rule 56, U.R.C.P., showing a gen-
uine issue on any material fact. 
The trial court's granting summary judgment in 
favor of defendants, no cause of aetion, should there-
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fore be affirmed and defendants should be awarded 
their costs on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SKEEN, WORSLEY, SNOW 
& CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Defendants 
701 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
